Nicolas HeynderickxPublic policy · European regulatory affairs
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“Chez Nous” and everywhere else: populism and its dangers for Europe

In 2025, populism is redefining Europe, amplifying the divisions between elites and citizens. This article explores the causes and impacts of this rise, symbolised by a leader

Democracy · European Union

As this year 2025 begins, the liberal political sphere finds itself thrust into the media spotlight with an affair that many of its members would rather have done without. Several figures from the Chez Nous party have now joined the ranks of the Mouvement Réformateur. With a little over 64,000 votes in the federal elections of 9 June 2024, the “Chez Nous” party did not achieve the hoped-for success (0.92% of all votes cast). If success does not come to you, it is easier to go and find it where it is more present. Indeed, like any good opportunist, one must know how to change one’s coat in time.

[Chez Nous?] The young political party, mainly present in Wallonia, was founded in 2021 by Jérôme Meunier and Grégory Vanden Bruel. President of the youth wing of the Parti Populaire from 2009 to 2011, the former seems to have been a follower of far-right populist theories for about fifteen years. As for the latter, he already appeared in 2014 as a likely running mate of Mischaël Modrikamen, founder of the Parti Populaire. Unable to boast a clearly defined political ideology, Chez Nous seems rather to present itself as a run-of-the-mill “catch-all” populist party, of the kind that unfortunately abounds in Europe: identitarianism, anti-globalisation, economic nationalism, opposition to immigration, anti-Islam, Euroscepticism, etc. All that remains is to choose the labels that best match the fears of the moment.

We wish to seize on this news to offer you a piece proposing a broader study of the rise of populism in Europe and of the challenges this phenomenon poses for democracy. The study of the Belgian case will allow us to see that it is now a diffuse problem affecting all European states.

To do so, we propose an analysis in three parts. In the first part, we will try to define what the notion of populism covers in common usage. The second part will set out the dangers that populist movements represent in the European Union. Finally, we will conclude this article by proposing avenues of reflection aimed at addressing the problem of the democratic deficit within European states.

1. Populism

Nowadays, the notion of populism is present everywhere — in media, political and academic debates in Europe — and it symbolises fears about the future of our democratic societies. However, the abusive use of this term sometimes creates confusion. Indeed, this notion is regularly invoked to name, or even discredit, very heterogeneous political actors and parties, supposedly presenting a common front against liberal democracy.

Populism remains a notion difficult to grasp and is today among the most controversial concepts in the social sciences, which prevents it from being taken seriously by a good number of researchers. To the point that some describe it as a “cacophonous” field of research. If, historically, the term carried a rather positive acceptation (the Russian term narodnichestvo designating a political movement in 1870s Russia advocating a specific path towards socialism), it now characterises a myriad of phenomena — first on the left, then increasingly oriented towards the right of the political spectrum, while creeping into public debate.

1.1. An attempt at defining populism

As it appears in European public debate, the term populism serves to stigmatise all political movements that claim to speak for the popular will but whose demands are considered pernicious by whoever is reporting on them. Far from the romantic image it may have aroused in the past, populism now conjures up an image of a fear of the masses and of the eternal opposition between the irrationality of popular passions and the rationality of experts. The difficulty is to distinguish between populist expressions and authentic populism. The ideational approach, theorised by J.-W. Müller on one side, and by Mudde and Kaltwasser on the other, in two distinct works, helps to clarify things. For Müller, populism is defined by two aspects: it is anti-elitist and anti-pluralist. In this view, populists present themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of a homogeneous people, a vision that would grant them legitimacy against the other traditional political parties.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, for their part, attempt to propose a broader and less polemical definition than that of Jan-Werner Müller. For these two authors, populism can be described as a thin ideology — an ideology that must fill its gaps by borrowing content from socialism (left-wing populism), from nationalism and economic liberalism (right-wing populism), and which considers that society is split in two and traversed by an antagonism between, on one side, the idea of a “pure people” and, on the other, a “corrupt elite”, and which asserts that politics can only be the result of the expression of the general will of the people. Thus, their definition of populism rests on three pillars that structure its core: (1) the people, (2) the corrupt elite and (3) the general will.

To summarise, the ideal-type of populism is the result of a conceptual decision, which claims the intelligibility induced by its typological organisation of reality, but which remains a normative choice. Thus, political populism (of the left/right), as it appears to us in Europe, can be understood as an ideology that refers to the people in order to oppose them to the governing elite, which has monopolised power and is reproached for having abandoned the interests of the many to favour its own. Denouncing representative democracy, populism intends to “give power back to the people”.

1.2. The breakthrough of populist parties in Europe

While the rise of the first anti-system parties — often quick in success but short-lived — dates back to the 1980s, these fleeting experiences served as fertile ground for better-organised and widely publicised political formations (the FN in France (1983), the FPÖ in Austria (1986), the Northern League (1991) and Forza Italia (2013) in Italy, the VB (1979) in Belgium, etc.). It is above all over these last ten years that these parties, carried by the crisis of confidence in institutions and governing elites, have managed to embed themselves durably in a majority of the Union’s states. The acceleration of globalisation, as well as the standardisation of economic and political difficulties, have been a boon for the progress of populism in the various elections since 2010. Let us also note that the hegemony of regional and international institutions, the emergence of new great powers (Brazil, China, India) or the successive waves of migratory flows all constitute so many attacks on the sovereignty of nation-states.

At the European level, their discourses are too heterogeneous to point to a united, uniform and homogeneous movement; the various European populisms do not converge on a predetermined ideology. This heterogeneity partly explains their difficulty in coexisting within the European institutions and in adopting a common vision.

1.3. The populist right

These parties, located on the right of the political spectrum, are mainly characterised by their radical political project. They advocate an identitarian retreat as well as exclusive access to national resources and wealth for the “true” nationals (as opposed to the others). Through a politicisation of cultural issues, these movements structure an ethnocentric nationalist offer by embodying the role of guardian against the threats represented by immigration, ethnic minorities or Islam. The societal model is generally modelled on a conservative — even authoritarian — vision of society.

The abundant literature devoted to the populist right shows the centrality of nativism as well as the rejection of multiculturalism in these movements’ political offer. Nevertheless, their positions on economic questions can vary. While some remain tinged with a certain liberal vision of the economy, others adopt a much more anti-globalist, interventionist and protectionist discourse.

2. The dangers of populism for the Union’s democracy

2.1. Discourses that call into question the fundamental principles of the EU

The European Union is a union of states built on common fundamental democratic values, defined in Article 2 of the TEU: freedom, pluralist democracy, tolerance, respect for human dignity, equality and non-discrimination, justice, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the protection of minorities constitute the basis of the European Union.

Populist movements constantly call into question the project of European integration and the fundamental values — yet essential — of the European Union. Community law is an affront to national sovereignty. The rights of minorities are an insult to national values, human rights a poor concern of the elites. The European project is said to be a cultural threat, a source of economic insecurity, and to bring about the disappearance of the historic privileges of certain social groups or the less protective character of the welfare state.

It is the relative inability of liberal democracies to protect their citizens against the vagaries of the markets, and the poor handling of the migration crisis that is ravaging Europe, that casts doubt on the benefits of European integration. By opposing the European project head-on, populist parties — and especially those of the far right — commit to a return to the prosperous period when national jobs were protected against the “illegitimate” competition of low-production-cost states by customs duties and controls. Populism becomes the spokesperson for the safeguarding of the welfare state.

This also brings us to the migration question. Migratory movements have always existed on European territory; they are part of its history, even if they were essentially intra-European. Many Europeans migrated for political reasons (war, religious persecution, etc.) or economic ones. Today, the migratory movements continuing in Europe are of a different nature (asylum seeking) and origin (mostly non-European populations). The opening of Europe’s borders is said to be the cause of the large influx of immigrants. Yet the EU has adopted directives to manage the migration question.

Finally, populist discourse perceives the reception of refugees as an invasion that would undermine the nation-state’s support for its sovereign population and would be the cause of the loss of national values and traditions. These discourses feed absurd fears. Thus, populists manage to introduce onto the political agenda themes such as questions of identity, integration or immigration, the denunciation of the European construction, Islamophobia or the stigmatisation of globalisation.

2.2. Discourses that fuel discrimination and hatred

According to ECRI’s 2018 annual report, populist discourse continues to fuel the European political climate. It spreads a xenophobic and openly anti-migrant rhetoric, which gives rise, in some respects, to hateful expressions. The intentional divisions of society along national, ethnic or religious lines constitute a worrying phenomenon. By spreading a discourse based on identity cleavages, populist ideology threatens the inclusive European societal model and risks eroding the principles based on tolerance that constitute the foundations of European democratic societies. For populism, multiculturalism turns into an undesirable element for our societies.

The racist vision advocated by some locks individuals within a stereotyped group. By operating a distinction between “us” and “them”, populism attempts to legitimise the advantages that should be granted to the former but not to the latter, in order to establish a discriminatory system. This discourse generally takes shape in contexts of the breakdown of social ties, and substitutes bonds of solidarity with fantasised, mythical bonds.

Thus, populist discourse seeks to capitalise on the attitudes of part of the population, playing on divisive subjects such as disgust for a designated minority, belief in preconceived ideas that justify discrimination, and hatred of the foreigner (migrants, undocumented people and Muslims present in secularised societies).

  1. Conclusion: rethinking democracy to limit populist breakthroughs?

While the scientific literature does not fully manage to agree on an exact definition of populism, our research has led us to consider that it is always built around a logic combining three elements: the “pure people”, the “corrupt elites” and the “sovereign will”. On the left as on the right, political figures denounce representative democracy and its institutions, which monopolise power — political and economic — to the detriment of the “sovereign people”. As we have seen, the Union represents the ultimate scapegoat; populism has reached its highest level in Europe since the 1930s (on average the populist vote was 24% in the EU in 2019). Admittedly, social stability and economic progress have a leading role to play in sweeping away the concerns aroused by populism and Euroscepticism, but that is not enough.

So what paths should be followed to remedy the populist ills within the Union?

Rethinking democracy: populist movements strengthen when citizens do not feel well represented by the political institutions. It is imperative to reintegrate individuals, particularly young people, into the political process. Thinking about populism leads us to better understand democracy and its ambiguities. Indeed, the question of populism is intrinsically linked to that of democracy; we must apprehend populism as an internal tension of democracy in order to reinvent and rebuild it, so as to attenuate populist excesses. We must also strengthen the control of civil society — and of citizens — over political decisions, and establish a democracy of interactions between the political sphere and society.

We can no longer rely solely on traditional institutional reforms; we must lead political actors to account, more systematically, for their acts. Moreover, it could prove useful to adopt other measures such as limiting the accumulation of mandates, guarantees of transparency or a regular renewal of political representatives. Political parties should be able to open more easily to new members, notably for specific projects or short-term involvements. Finally, our democracies must innovate and move, as far as possible, towards new models of open citizen participation.

Nicolas H.

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