Section 301 against the DMA: when a trade instrument targets the competence to legislate
In brief — On 23 July, the European Commission fined Google €890 million for two breaches of the Digital Markets Act, with sixty days to comply. The following day, the US President announced a Section 301 investigation. One clarification is needed: to date, no formal initiation of an investigation targeting the DMA has been published. But the announcement, read alongside the visa restrictions imposed in December on five Europeans, traces a shift that should be named — from litigation over the effect of a measure to contestation of the competence to adopt it.
Two days, two logics
On 23 July 2026, the European Commission adopted two non-compliance decisions against Google under the Digital Markets Act. The first, carrying a fine of €460 million, sanctions self-preferencing: Google gives more favourable treatment to its own services — shopping, hotels, transport, sports results — in the ranking of search results. The second, of €430 million, targets the restrictions imposed on developers wishing to inform their users of alternative offers and direct them to other distribution channels. Total: €890 million, the largest penalty imposed to date under this regulation.
The press release sets out what follows. Google has sixty days to comply — that is, until 21 September 2026 — failing which it faces periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of its total worldwide turnover. The Commission further notes that the company has proposed and begun testing changes, including to how it presents its services in AI Overviews and AI Mode, and describes these steps as substantial progress.
The following day, 24 July, the US President accused the Union of “robbing” American companies and announced the immediate initiation of an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 into the treatment of US technology groups.
An announcement is not the initiation of an investigation
The distinction is not formal. Section 301 is a procedure, and that procedure has public stages: the US Trade Representative initiates an investigation on its own motion or upon petition — in which case it has forty-five days to decide — publishes a notice of initiation in the Federal Register, opens a comment period and a public hearing, enters into consultations with the foreign government concerned, and issues its determination within twelve months. That period extends to eighteen months where the matter falls under a trade agreement with a dispute settlement mechanism.
At the time of writing, no notice of initiation specifically targeting the Digital Markets Act could be identified in Federal Register publications or on the Trade Representative’s website. This is a negative finding based on accessible public sources; it does not amount to proof of absence.
What does exist, by contrast, is documented. Section 301 investigations into the digital services taxes adopted by several European states have long been open. And an executive order of February 2025 had already instructed the Trade Representative to examine the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. The announcement of 24 July therefore reactivates a standing instruction rather than opening a new procedure. So long as no notice is published, the twelve-month clock has not begun to run.
The shift that should be named
The interest of the episode lies not in its timing but in its object.
Section 301 authorises retaliatory measures against the “acts, policies and practices” of a foreign government that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden US commerce. Historically, the instrument has targeted subsidies, market-access barriers, failures to protect intellectual property — that is, measures assessed by their economic effects.
Applying it to the enforcement of a regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, by the European Parliament and the Council, effects a slippage. What is then contested is no longer the effect of a measure on an American operator, but the power to adopt the measure. For a lawyer the difference is considerable: one belongs to trade litigation, the other to normative competence.
A second element confirms this shift, and it is earlier. In December 2025, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on five European nationals, among them former Commissioner Thierry Breton, associated with the drafting of the Digital Services Act, as well as officials of the German organisation HateAid. The justification advanced was participation in organised efforts to coerce American platforms into censoring American viewpoints. The measure no longer targeted a norm: it targeted individuals, by reason of their contribution to that norm. The French President described these measures as intimidation and coercion directed against European digital sovereignty; the German and French governments defended democratically adopted laws.
A jurisdictional answer, not an economic one
The Commission’s reply deserves to be read for what it is. Asked about the accusation of discrimination, it did not argue on the figures, on the share of American companies among open proceedings, or on the proportionality of the fines. It recalled the “sovereign right to regulate economic activities on its territory”, specifying that this principle extends to digital policy. The Commissioner for competition indicated that Brussels would not compromise on its regulatory framework under American pressure.
That is an answer of competence, set against a challenge to competence. On this point at least, both parties have correctly identified the terrain.
It may finally be noted that the decision of 23 July sits awkwardly with the narrative of a trade barrier. It follows investigations opened on 25 March 2024, a statement of preliminary findings on 19 March 2025 and the full exercise of the rights of defence; it takes note of changes already undertaken by the company and describes them as progress. This is the ordinary operation of an administrative compliance procedure, not a levy.
What to watch between now and the autumn
Three deadlines will make assessment verifiable rather than conjectural. The first is 21 September: if Google complies within the deadline, the trade grievance loses part of its object, since no penalty payments will be due. The second is whether or not a notice of initiation is published in the Federal Register: only that will convert the announcement into a procedure and start the statutory clocks. The third is the fate of proceedings opened under the Digital Services Act, whose logic — content moderation — lends itself more readily than competition law to the free-expression register invoked in December.
Key points
- The Commission fined Google €890 million on 23 July 2026 (€460 million for self-preferencing in Search, €430 million for steering restrictions on Play), with sixty days to comply, that is by 21 September, on pain of periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of worldwide turnover.
- The presidential announcement of 24 July does not amount to the initiation of an investigation: no notice of initiation targeting the DMA has been identified to date in the Federal Register, and the statutory time limits have therefore not begun to run.
- An executive order of February 2025 had already instructed the Trade Representative to examine the DMA and the DSA; separate investigations into digital services taxes are also open.
- The point of interest is the shift in object: an instrument designed to sanction commercial practices is directed against a legislative act and, in December 2025, against the individuals who contributed to drafting it.
- The Commission answers on the ground of competence — “sovereign right to regulate economic activities on its territory” — not on that of economic proportionality.
Sources
- European Commission, press release, “Commission fines Google €890 million for breaches of the Digital Markets Act”, Brussels, 23 July 2026 (amounts, required remedies, 60-day deadline, periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of worldwide turnover, procedural history since the September 2023 designation).
- Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act).
- Trade Act of 1974, section 301; Congressional Research Service, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, IF11346, for the description of the procedure and determination deadlines.
- Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Section 301 Investigations” page and “Section 301 – Digital Services Taxes” file, consulted 5 August 2026.
- Executive order of February 2025 instructing the Trade Representative to examine the European regulations on digital markets and digital services.
- On the December 2025 visa restrictions: US Department of State, announcement by the Secretary of State; concordant reports by PBS NewsHour, CNN, CNBC and CBC, December 2025, together with the reactions of the French and German governments.
- Statements by the European Commission on the “sovereign right to regulate economic activities on its territory”, reported in the specialist press, July 2026.
Note on sources: the amounts, deadlines and procedural steps cited come from official documents. Political statements and retaliation figures reported in the press — contemplated tariff levels, lists of targeted companies — have not been relied on here, for want of a verifiable primary source.